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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3<a) of tne 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This action is an appeal 
from a denial of a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by the 
Honorable Judith M. Billings, a Judge of Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utan, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on 
September 11, 1986. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in failing to grant judgment in 
favor of Petitioner? 
2. Did the lower court properly consider the evidence 
presented? 
3. Did the lower court fail to rule on each of the issues? 
5III5MINAIIVE LAW 
I n e r t 11 i no determinative c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions, 
s ta tutes , ordinances , r u l e s , nni u M ^ I I I i' i "in u --e 
in t erpre ta t ion i s a e t e i w 2 na 12 ve 01 tne i s sues in * 113 j .a e . 
AIISIHI QZ CASE 
1 1 ,. a t • :: 1 1 • :: 1: a b out the x ^  L r x day of July, 1964, Petitioner was 
con vie tea altei 1 iiiry trial by t!v=3 i» n 1 <in U- '"i" n«-' 1* ' 1 , ov, . n , 
of aggrava t ed our g i a r y 1 f 1 r s t degree £e i ony ; DII 1 g ± a v ;' , "» t n 1 r d 
deqrpe f eIonv; and theft
 w \ cI a s s H m \seemeanor, Shortly 
thereaftei , 111 apoenl was 1 1 I ^ n in ' < lit 1 hi .••iiipi'^niH " - < n 1 T t 
cnallenging Mr. Porter's conviction, wruchiappeal was denied. 
Fftt 3! 1 ,,-ner tnen filed a Writ 01 Habeas Corpus in case number 
C86-34G9 oe± ore the rlonoraole UUJ I h IJI 1 1 I inu 1 n ' -r nt :-*Mi"> 
As part of t nn t wr .1 t , 111 Por r. er n x x egea tna r_ ne was denied 
*» r' f Pct 1 ve ass 1 stance of connsel , prosecutor 1 a 1 error , aen 1 a 1 of 
compulsory process, deru ii, MI I IMI' r, 1,. , •••e^d'/ r 1 i n refusal of 
t h e trial c o u r t t ID a i 1 o w r" etitioner t", o preterit c e r t a 1 n «:J viaence, 
and denial of the right t.o effective appeal. 
• 1 1 M.I 1 i ",:e „, .in H"" Minierri IMI i'l^ nr i nq was neia on trie 
.Otr -;i*- r-r deptember, 1986, at which time Petitioner and various 
witnesses presented testimony. 
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Shortly thereafter, on the 11th day of September, 1986, 
judgment was rendered by the Honorable Judith M. Billings against 
Petitioner and in favor of the State of Utah. 
That snortly thereafter, Petitioner filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that a proper review of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding nis case and his criminal conviction 
will show tnat he was aenied certain fundamental legal rights and 
that had his matter Deen properly argued, he would not have been 
found guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
It is well known that Petitioner is entitled to not only 
have counsel, but that that counsel be effective. In ShiDman^y^ 
Gladden, 453 P2d. 921 (Or. 1969), the Oregon Supreme Court stated 
tnat, 
The due process right of a defendant to assistance of 
counsel requires more than pro forma representation; it 
envisions the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Petitioner asserts that a review of the record will show 
that the representation given to him does not rise to the level 
required for protection of nis constitutional rights. See also, 
Alires v._Turner, 449 P2d. 241 (Utah 1969). 
6 
A. COUNSEL DID NOT USE HIS BEST EFFORT IN REPRESENTING 
PETITIONER AT TRIAL. 
Petitioner would assert that during trial ana at pre-
trial preparation interviews he was agitated, nervous and 
pre-occupied. He also failed to appear for appointments or 
perform tasKs which he indicated would be done. As a 
result. Petitioner would assert that teome matter preventea 
trial counsel from assisting him to the best of nis ability. 
Petitioner would also assert that the failure of trial 
counsel to use nis best efforts can be shown from tne 
material in the balance of this sectiqn. 
B. TRIAL COUNSEL REFUSED TO PERFORI^ ANY INVESTIGATION TO 
VERIFY PETITIONER'S STORY OR TO OBTAIN WITNESSES. 
The testimony introduced during the hearing on this 
matter should show that Counsel failed to maKe the effort 
necessary to research, investigate <^r present Petitioner's 
version of the facts. Petitioner vfoula assert tnat he 
presented Counsel with sufficient evidence to determine tnat 
he was in fact innocent. This evidence related to witnesses 
availaole, and the physical layout of the apartment ouilaing 
where the alleged crime took place. From the facts, it is 
also obvious that Counsel did not really believe 
Petitioner's story until well into the trial when it was too 
late to change things. See, Transgript of Habeas Corpus 
Hearing, pages 5-7. (Hereafter HT) 
C. TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPERLY OBJECT TO AND/OR ARGUE 
THE FACTS. 
The Petitioner's Trial Memorandum and the record of the 
evidentuary hearing on Petitioner's Writ of Haoeas Corpus 
will show that the testimony of the apartment manager was 
both erroneous and inconsistent, (HT, pages 13-14), tnat the 
manager's wife should not have been allowed to testify since 
she had sat through the preliminary proceeding witn the 
exclusionary rule invoked and the prosecutor nad indicated 
she would not be called at trial, <HT, page 9 ) , tnat the 
property in Defendant's possession at the time of the crime 
fits more closely his version of tne facts than tnat of 
robbery, (HT, pages 9-10), that there was conflicting 
testimony as to the scanner, <HT, pages 11-12), that the 
coat linking him to the crime was not his, (HT, page 12), 
tnat the change found in his coat was not consistent, with 
the alleged amounts taken, (HT, page 12-13 and 26-27), and 
that the facts testified to by tne manager ana nis wife were 
physically impossible, (HT, pages 13-14)- Further that 
trial counsel failed to properly oring these items to tne 
attention of the jury as well as correct certain erroneous 
drawings and pictures introduced at trial by the prosecutor, 
(HT, pages 13-14 and 19-20). 
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Further, the laundry room door had pry marks on it 
which was not pointed out to the jury |<HT, pages 14-15; and 
that there was an attempted break-in to another tenant's 
apartment (HT, page 25) which evidence) shows that there were 
multiple incidences of the use of a pjrying device and the 
jury was not informed that no such device was recovered. 
Petitioner would argue that these defects, when 
cumulatively considered, cannot bq considered harmless 
error, and should provide him with trie opportunity of a new 
trial. This is especially so when no rebuttal testimony was 
offered by the State on the issuies of: property in 
Defendant's possession not fitting the crime; conflicting 
testimony as to the scanner-, change found in the coat was 
not consistent with alleged amounts taken, facts testified 
to by the manager and his wife were physically impossible, 
trial counsel failed to correct erroneous drawings and 
pictures introduced by the prosecutoif and failed to bring 
out the possibility of other parties being involved in the 
theft based upon the pry marks. 
POINT II 
PROSECUTORIAL ERROR PREJUDICED PETITIONEE'S CHANCES AT TRIAL 
A. THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH 
ESCULPATGRY EVIDENCE. 
The Petitioner alleges that "Che State failed to provide 
i 
him with esculpatory evidence when it: <1) failed to 
adequately investigate the crime, (2) failed to provide him 
with the name of an individual who had alleged an attempted 
apartment break-m this same night, K3> failed to perform a 
sobriety test when he was obviously intoxicated, and <4) 
failed to provide him with the fingerprint report prior to 
trial. 
In State^y^^Bowen, «±49 P2d. 603 (Ariz. 1969;, tne 
Arizona Supreme Court stated the general rule that a 
prosecutor's concealment of evidence violates due process. 
Further, in Peogie^y^^Hitch, 527 P2a. 361 (Cal. J.974), the 
Court indicated that intentional supression of material 
evidence favorable to the Defendant who has requestea such 
evidence, constitutes a violation of cue process, 
irrespective of good or bad faith on the part of the 
prosecution. The Petitioner would allege that the failures 
on the part of the prosecution m this particular matter 
were material, in that had they occurred, Petitioner would 
not have been found guilty. 
For example, had the reports of the fingerprint 
examination been provided to Appellant, it would nave shown 
that Appellant's prints were not on the weapon, nor were 
Appellant's prints on any of the damaged equipment from 
which funds were taken. This evidence would have been 
clearly esculpatory. Furtner, the failure of the police 
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department to investigate tne inconsistency between pry 
marks on locations from which money was taken and no pry 
marks on the room in which Appellant was found, and no pry 
bar being found on Appellant or at thte scene, indicates a 
quick-fix attitude on the part of investigators and no real 
desire to find the responsible parties <HT, page 15). 
B. THE PROSECUTOR INTENTIONALLY USED PERJURED TESTIMONY. 
The Petitioner would allege that the prosecutor either 
knew or should have known that the (scanner testimony by 
officers would be inconsistent. Further, that he knew or 
should have known that the radio was Inot, a police scanner, 
and was not on when the police arrived at the apartment. As 
a result, the Petitioner contends that the prosecutor 
intentionally acted to mislead the jury by the use of 
perjured police testimony in the inference that the radio 
was something which it was not <HT, pdges 15-16). 
Petitioner alleges further errc|>r in that the drawing 
and pictures introduced at trial wetfe erroneous and the 
prosecutor either knew or should hav^ known that they were. 
As a result, the evidence presented was clearly in error and 
presented in an attempt to mislead th^ jury ^LS to the actual 
facts. 
As a result. Petitioner would allege that the 
prosecutor breached his duty of not kiiowingiy using perjured 
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or false testimony, and, that because the prosecutor 
breached said duty, Petitioner nas been deprived of his due 
process rights. See, State^v^^Ferrari, 541 P2d. 921 (Ariz. 
1975). It should also be noted that the State provided no 
contradictory testimony on tnese issues and no ruling on 
this issue was made by the District Court. 
POINT III 
EIXIII9MI3 WAS DENIED COMPULSORY PROCESS 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide tnat a 
defendant is entitled to compulsory process to obtain witnesses 
in his behalf. Petitioner would allege tnat this right was not 
afforded to him, and as a result, he was denied his constitu-
tional rights. 
It would appear that an apartment resident complained of an 
attempted break-in tne same evening that tne alleged burglary 
took place. Petitioner asserts that if he had been able to call 
tnat individual as a witness, it would nave proven his contention 
that a third party did in fact commit the burglary and that he 
was an unwitting victim of circumstance (HT, page 25). 
POINT IV 
IHI I8IAL QQUEI ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW SCANNER EVIDENCE 
The Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in its 
refusal to allow m m to turn the scanner on for tne jury. (HT, 
pages 17-18). He asserts that had he been able to do so, he 
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could have easily proven the discrepency in police testimony and 
he was a professional 
) • It should also be 
ake a ruling in its 
dispelled the jury's false impression that 
burglar. Since this was critical to his defense, the Petitioner 
asserts that it was clear error for the cpurt to have refused 
such a minor request. See, SUte^v^Pierre, 572 ?2d. 1338 (Utah 
1977), Cheatwgod^v^PegEle, 435 ?2d. 402 (Colo. 1967), and 
£ndrews_Vj,_Hand, 372 P2d. 559 (Kan. 1962 
noted that the District Court failed to ml 
decision regarding this issue. 
POINT V 
THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO £N EFFECTIVE APPEAL 
First, the Petitioner indicates that appeal counsel refused 
to argue the issue of trial counsel's incompetence, the refusal 
of the judge to allow the scanner to be turned on, and the matter 
I 
of the manager's wife testifying at trial. <HT, page 18). In the 
case of Gardner_vi—State, 435 P2d. 249 (Idaho 1967), the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that once an appelate procedure is provided, 
I 
it must meet constitutional requirements of due process and equal 
protection. Further, that the decision to appeal rests solely 
with the Defendant. Further, in the ca£e of Peogle^v^^Rhoden, 
492 P2d. 1143 (Cal. 1972), the Court stated that the failure of 
counsel to raise any arguably meritorious contention results in 
denial of constitutionally effective assistance of a counsel on 
appeal. Also, m In_Re_Smith, 474 P2d. 969 (Cal. 1970), the 
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Court furtner statea that tne possibility of defeat of any issue 
does not render appellate counsel's failure to raise an issue on 
appeal any tne less a denial of effective appellate assistance. 
Petitioner argues that had all issues oeen argued on appeal, that 
he would not now be in prison and as a result has been denied his 
constitutional rights. 
Second, Petitioner testified that appellate counsel refused 
to allow m m to participate in tne appeal process. He never met 
with the Petitioner, refused to answer Petitioner's questions, 
ana wouia not provide Petitioner with a copy of the transcript so 
that Petitioner could point out problems and errors. Obviously, 
tnis would have assisted appeal counsel, since he had not been 
Petitioner's original trial counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, petitioner respectfully submits that 
tne evidence was not sufficient to convict him, that his legal 
rights have been violated, that the District Court failed to 
fulfil its duty under Rule 65b(i)(S) and that the only 
appropriate remedy is release from custody. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, JENSEN & IVINS 
Philip G. Jones 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
15 
own motion, or upon the request of either party, 
may order a prehearing conference if good reason 
exists therefor; but such conference shall not be set 
so as to unreasonably delay the hearing on the 
merits of the complaint. The complainant shall be 
brought before the court for any hearing or confe-
rence. 
If the court in which the complaint is filed deter-
mines that in the interest of convenience and 
economy, the hearing should be transferred to the 
district court having jurisdiction over the place of 
confinement of complainant, the court may enter a 
irritten order transferring such case and shall set 
forth in such order its reasons for so doing. 
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining the 
ase, shall enter specific findings Of fact and concl-
usions of law and judgment, in writing, and the 
ame shall be made a part of the record in the case. 
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it 
[tall enter an appropriate order with respect to the 
jdgment or sentence in the former proceedings and 
*ch further orders with respect to rearraignment, 
striJ, custody, bail or discharge as the court may 
eem just and proper in the case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the costs 
f the proceedings, he may proceed in forma pau-
rris upon the filing of an affidavit to that effect, in 
hich event the court may direct the costs to be 
lid by the county in which he was originally 
larged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such com-
aint may be appealed to and reviewed by the 
ipreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil cases. 
LLE 66. RECEIVERS 
Grounds for Appointment. 
Appointment of Receiver. 
Undertaking on Ex Parte Appointment. 
Oath and Undertaking of Receiver. 
Powers of Receivers. 
Payment of Taxes Before Sale or Hypothecation of 
Personal Property, 
lavestments by Receivers. 
Appointment of Receiver on Dissolution of 
corporation, 
dismissal of Action. 
Grounds for Appointment. 
i receiver may be appointed by the court in 
ch an action is pending or has passed to judg-
it: 
I) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudu-
purchase of property, or by a creditor to 
icct any property or fund to his claim, or 
veen partners or others jointly owning or inter-
d in any property or fund, on the application of 
plaintiff, or of any party whose right to or int-
t in the property or fund, or the proceeds 
eof, is probable, and where it is shown that the 
*rty or fund is in danger of being lost, removed 
fcterially injured. 
) In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclo-
of his mortgage and sale of the mortgaged 
*ny, where it appears that the mortgaged pro-
r
 is in danger of being lost, removed or mater-
injured; or that the conditions of the mortgage 
not been performed and that the property is 
*My insufficient to discharge the mortgage 
the pendency of an appeal, or in proceedings in aid 
of execution when an execution has been returned 
unsatisfied, or when the judgment debtor refuses to 
apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment. 
(5) In cases where a corporation has been disso-
lved or is insolvent or in imminent danger of insol-
vency or has forfeited its corporate rights. 
(6) In all other cases where receivers have heret-
ofore been appointed by the usages of courts of 
equity. 
(b) Appointment of Receiver. 
No party or attorney to the action, nor any 
person who is not entirely impartial and disintere-
sted as to all the parties and the subject matter of 
the action can be appointed receiver therein without 
the written consent of all interested parties. 
(c) Undertaking on Ex Parte Appointment. 
If a receiver is appointed upon an ex parte appli-
cation, the court, before making the order, may 
require from the applicant an undertaking, with 
sufficient sureties, in an amount to be fixed by the 
court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to the 
adverse party all damages he may sustain by reason 
of the appointment of such receiver and the entry by 
him upon his duties, in case the applicant has pro-
cured such appointment wrongfully, maliciously or 
without sufficient cause; and the court may, in its 
discretion, at any time after such appointment, 
require an additional undertaking. 
(d) Oath and Undertaking of Receiver. 
Befbre entering upon his duties a receiver must be 
sworn to perform them faithfully, and with one or 
more sureties, approved by the court, execute an 
undertaking to such persons and in such sum as the 
court may direct, to the effect that he will faithfully 
discharge the duties of receiver in the action and 
obey the orders of the court therein. 
(e) Powers of Receivers. 
A receiver has, under the direction of the court, 
power to bring and defend actions in his own name 
as receiver, to take and keep possession of the pro-
perty, to receive rents, to collect debts, to comp-
ound for and compromise the same, to make tran-
sfers and generally to do such acts respecting the 
property as the court may authorize. 
(0 Payment of Taxes Before Sale or Hypothecation 
of Personal Property. 
Before any personal property coming into the 
hands of a receiver may be sold, transferred or 
hypothecated, such receiver shall pay and discharge 
any and all taxes constituting a lien thereon, legally 
levied by any taxing unit of the state, and shall file 
with the court having jurisdiction of such receiver-
ship, receipts or other competent evidence showing 
the full payment and discharge of any and all such 
taxes, provided, that in a case where no sufficient 
liquid assets are at the time of the proposed sale, 
transfer or hypothecation, in the hands of such 
receiver, the court having jurisdiction of such rece-
ivership may authorize such sale, transfer or hypo-
thecation to be made prior to the payment and dis-
charge of such taxes, but immediately upon receipt 
of the consideration for such sale, transfer or hyp-
othecation such receiver shall pay and discharge all 
such liens, taxes, and within ten days thereafter shall 
US For ANNOTATIONS, consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 4 1 5 
STEPHEN W. POSTER, 
CALLED AS A WIINLSS BY AND ON BEHAL(F OF THE PETITIONER, HAVING,' 
BEEN FIRS! DULY SWORN TO TELL THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH AND 
NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, WAS EXAMINE!} AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION, 
BY MR, JONES: 
Q WOULD YOU PLEASE INDICATE YOUR FULL NAME FOR THE 
COURT AND YOUR CURRENT LOCATION? 
A STEPHEN WAYNE PORTER. I AM AN INMATE AT THE UTAH 
STATE PFISON. 
C ARE YOU THE SAME INMATE WHO'S FILED A PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THIS MATTER? 
A YES. 
Q AND IN THAT PETITION YOU'VE ALLEGED THAT YOUR 
ATTORNEY DID NCT USE HIS BEST EFFORTS TO REPRESENT YOU. COULD 
YOU BRIEFLY INDICATE TO THE COURT' YOUR REASONS WHY. 
A WELL, THE CASE REQUIRED A LOT OF DETAIL. A LOT 
OF THE ITEMS FOUND ON ME TOOK A LOT OF—A CERTAIN AMOUNT CF 
EXPLAINING. THE CIRCUMSTANCES TOOK A LOT OF LOOKING INTO. 
I PREVIOUSLY FIRED MY ORIGINAL ATTORNEY BECAUSE 
SHE HAD NOT LOOKED INTO THE MATERIAL ADEQUATELY. AND HE 
PROMISED ME HE WOULD LOOK INTO 1^  CLOSER AND HE DIDN'T. HE 
DIDN'T MAKE HIS APPOINTMENTS; DIDN'T SHOW UP WHEN HE SAID HE 
WAS GOING TO SHOW UP. 3UET KEPT STALLING ME ON A CASE ALL 
I 
L j l e e n M. A m b r o s e , C . f . J> . 5 
T 0GE1HLJ* . 
0 WERE THERE ANY OTHER THINGS ABOUT HIS CONDUCT WHEN 
HE MET WIIH YOU THAT YOU THINK ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE COURl 
TO KNOW ABOUT? 
A WELL, HE'S VERY IMPATIENT WITH ME. I HAD TO KEEP 
REPEATING POINTS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE. HE KEPT TRYING TO PI"" 
ME OFF, TELLING ME HE'D BE BACK LATER ON SO WE COULD SPEND 
MORE TIME AND GO OVER IT IN MORE DETAIL. HE JUST — 
0 OKAY. YOUfVE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE REFUSED TC 
INVESTIGATE AND OBTAIN WITNESSES. WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THAr 
ALLEGATION? 
A WELL, STEMS BACK TO THE PROBLEM WITH THE FIRST 
ATTORNEY. I ASKED HIM —SEE, PART OF MY TESTIMONY I WAS 
WAITING OUTSIDE IN THE VEHICLE WITH SOME OTHER PEOPLE AT 
THE APARTMENT BUILDING EARLIER. AND I ASKED HIM, I TOLD HI] 
THAI WHILE WE WERE WAITING THEIE SOMEBODY PULLED UP INVPARKE] 
IN A CAR AND LOOKED A1 IT. AND WHILE WE WERE STILL WAITING 
THERE SOMEBODY LOOKED OUT A WINDOW AT US. AND PART OF THE 
CONTENTION WAS I WAS SUPPOPSLD TO HAVE BEEN ALONE WHERE I WA 
WITH OTHER PEOPLE. AND I WANTED HIM TO CHECK WITH THE 
RESIDENTS ON THE SIDE OF THE APARTMENT BUILDING TO SEE IF AN 
OF THEM WOULD REMEMBER THL FACT I WAS THERE WITH SOME OTHER 
PEOPLE. 
Q TO THL BE SI Ob YOUR KNOWLEDGE DID H* EVER DO THAI 
A WELL,, NO, HL DIDN'T. HI TOLD ME HE DIDN'T THINK 
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1 I ANYBODY WOULD REMEMBER 11. IT THEY DID — AND 1 TOLD HIM, WELL, 
2 SOMEONE EE1NG ARRESTED IN THE BUILDING ALL THAT NIGHT, PEOPLE 
3 I COMING AND GOING, IT WOULD BE FIXED IN THEIR MEMORY, BUT HE 
4 IGNORED ML. 
5 0 YOU ALSO INDICATE YOU tfEEL HE FAILED TO PROPERLY 
6 J OBJECT TO OK AFGUE REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE APARTMENT 
7 I MANAGER. CAN YOU INDICATE TC THE JTOURT WHY YOU FEEL THAT WAS 
8 THE CASE? 
9 A WELL, MOST OF THE THINGS, NEARLY EVERYTHING THE 
10 J MANAGER SAID AT THE TRIAL, EITHEk SAID SOMETHING DIFFERENT 
11 I AT THE PRELIMINARY HEAFING OR THE ACTUAL FACTS, THE PHYSICAL 
12 ' LAYOUT OF THE APARTMENT BUILDING, THE THINGS THAT HE SAYS HE 
13 j COULD HAVE SEEN WHICH IT WAS REALLY PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOF 
14 HIM TO SEE. HE CLAIMS HE SAW THE LAYOUT OF THE APARTMENT IT-
15 ' SELF THAT I WAS FOUND IN IS NOT EVEN LIKE THE WAY HE SAID IT 
16 I WAS. 
17 Q I'D LIFE TC SHOW YOU T^IS DOCUMENT WHICH HAS BEEN 
18 MARKED PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1-P AND ASK YOU IF YOU RECOGNIZE 
19 THAT DOCUMENT. 
10 A YES, I DREW THAT. 
11 Q I S THAT A DOCUMENT WUl tH YOU, YOURSELF, PREPARED! 
12 A Y E S , I I I S . 
13 J 0 WHAT L O I S THAT DOCUMENT I URPORT TO BE? 
24 A IT ' S A FOUGH, NO SCALE DIAGRAM JUST FOR, I DID JUST 
25 FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES, TO SHOW THAT THE MANAGER'S VIEW 
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THROUGH IHE DOOR WAS SFVLRELY RESTRICTED AND THAT HE COULD NO 
HAVE SEEN EVERYTHING HE SAW. AND ALSO TO SHOW HOW THE APARTMEN' 
WAS LAID OUT, WHICH IS DIFFERENT THAN THE WAY THE MANAGER CLAIM, 
IT IS. 
Q NOW, YOU'VE INDICATED IN YOUR PLEADINGS THAT THE 
DRAWING THAT WAS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL DIFFERED FROM THE ACSUAI 
LAYOUT OF THE APARTMENT. NOW, DOES THIS DRAWING WHICH YOU HAVI 
PREPARED, IS THIS THE ACTUAL WAY THE APARTMENT LOOKED OR I£ 
THIS WHAT WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL? 
A THIS IS MOPE WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE. THE DRAWINGS 
PROVIDED AT TRIAL SHOW THE DOORS WERE ALL FLUSH WITH THE HALL-
WAY, WHICH IS VEPY INACCURATE. 
Q YOU SAY THEY ARE RECESSED? 
A YEAH, THEY WERE,RECESSED ABOUT THFEE FEET. MY 
FIRST ATTORNEY TOLD ME. 
MR. JONES: I'D LIKE TO ADMIT THIS IN EVIDENCE, YOUF 
HONOR. 
MS. HORNAK: I HAVE NOT OBJECTION. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: IT WILL BE RECEIVED. WHAT EXHIBIT 
NUMBER IS IT? 
MR. JONES: ONE. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: ONE WILL BE RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 1 WAS OFFERRED AND RECEIVED 
INTO EVIDENCE) . 
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C BY MR. JONES: YOU'Vi AL5 0 INDICA1ED 1HM YOU FELL 
Y0UR_A110kNEY ACTED IMIROFEKLY IN ALLOWING THE MANAGEF'S WIFE 
TO TESTIFY. WHY DO YOU bELILVL THAT 'S THE CASE? 
A DURING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING MY LAWYER, AT THE 
TIME NANCY BERGESON, INVOKED THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
AS EVERYONE WAS LEAVING 1 HE COURT ROOM THE PROSECUTOR, 
WHO WAS NOT THE SAME PROSECUTOR WHC HANDLED THE TRIAL, ASKED, 
STOOD OVER BY MRS. LYBEPT, CHRIS LYEEFT, AND ASKED IF SHE BE 
ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THE COURTROOM,LURING THE HEARING BECAUSE 
SHE WOULD NOT BE TESTIFYING AT ALL IN THE TRIAL. MY LAWYER 
AGREED TO UNDER THOSE CI RCUMST ANClls SHE COULD REMAIN AT THE 
HEARING. 
Q DID SHE, IN FACT, TESTIFY AT TRIAL? 
A YES, SHE DID. 
Q DID YOUR ATTORNEY CEJECh 10 THAT? 
6 ' A THEY HAD A CONSULTATION *.ITH THE JUDGE. I INFORMED 
j I 
7 HIM OF IT AND THEY HLD A CONSULT P? 1CN WITH THE JUDGE. 
8 Q SO YOU DID BRING TnAT TC YOUR COUNSELfS ATTENTION? 
9 A YES, I DID. 
0 Q YOU'VE ALSO INDICATED IN YOUR PLEADINGS THAT THE 
1 PROPERTY IN YOUR POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF YOUR ARREST SHOULD 
2 HAVE BEEN PROPERLY ARGUED B* YOUF ATTORNEY. WHAT SHOULD YOUR 
3 ATTORNEY HAVE DONE REGARDING IF;;: I I OP I FT Y? 
4 A WELL, THEY VvEFT 1 FY INC U' KAH OUT THAT I WAS 
5 SPECIFICALLY SET UP T 0 COMMIT J ( I l r.T WHERE, IN FACT, 1 HAD 
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TESTIFIED 1 WAS ON MY WAY 1 0 A MOTEL FOR THE NIGHT. I HAD 
BEEN TRAVELING WITH SOME FRIENDS AND WENT UP TO OGDEN AND I 
WAS STAYING FOR A FEW DAYS IN SALT LAKE, AND AMONGST MY 
BELONGINGS THERE WERE TOILET ARTICLES, A CHANGE OF SOCKS, 
THERE WAS A SMALL FROM RADIO/TELEVISION. I HAD ABOUT 
A DOZEN RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES, BATTERY RECHARGER, EIGHT PACKS 
OF COCOA, SOME OTHER ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT WIRES. I HAD AN 
ADAPTOR AND PROGRAMABLE HAND-HELD RADIO. 
0 LET ME SHOW YOU ANOTHFF DOCUMENT WHICH HAS BEEN 
MARKED PLAINTIFF'S EXHIEIT 2-P . ASK YOU IF YOU CAN RECOGNIZE 
THAT DOCUMENT. 
A YES. 
Q WHAT IS THAT DOCUMENT?J 
A ThIS IS THE ITEMS THAT WERE RELEASED FROM EVIDENCE 
TO ME AT THE PRISON AND ThIS IS THE PPISON'S RECEIPT TO ME FOR 
THOSL ITLMS. 
0 DOES THIS —DOES ThIS DOCUMENT LIST THE ITEMS OF 
PROPERTY OR SOME OF THE ITEMS OF PROPERTY YOU HAD IN YOUR 
POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF ARREST? 
A THIS IS THE MAJORITY OF THE ITEMS I HAD ON ME AT 
THE TIME. 
MR. JONES: THANK YOU. I'D LIKE TO ALSO INTRODUCE THAT 
INTO EVIDENCE — EXHIBIT 2. 
MS. HORNAK: I HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: IT WILL BE RECEIVED. 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.I. 10 
I 
(WHEREUPON, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
NUMBER 2 WAS OFFERED AND 
RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE). 
MR. JONES: THANK YOU. 
0 BY MR. JONES: YOU'VE ALSO INDICATED IN YOUR 
PLEADINGS THAT YOU FELT YOUR ATTORNEY SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE 
WITH THE SCANNER. CAN YOU TELL THE COURT WHY YOU FEEL THAT 
WAY? 
A WELL, BASICALLY, THIS IS PART OF THE PROBLEM I 
HAD IN TRYING TO EXPLAIN THINGS TO HIM. HE WAS SAYING STUFF 
THAT THEY FOUND YOU WITH THE POLICE SCANNER ON YOU. I SAID 
IT IS NOT A POLICE SCANNER, THERE IS NO LITERATURE THAT 
DESCRIBES IT AS A POLICt SCANNER. IT RECEIVES 37,000 SOME 
SEPARATE FREQUENCIES. AND IF SOME OF THOSE, TEN OR 20, 
HAPPEN TO BE POLICE FREQUENCIES THAT DOES NOT MAKE IT A 
POLICE SCANNER. AND IT VtLS NOT PROGRAMMED FOR POLICE 
FREQUENCIES. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO HIM IF IT HAD BEEN 
MONITORING THE POLICE FREQUENCY--IF I WAS COMMITING A CRIME 
AND I WAS MONITORING THE POLICE FREQUENCY I WOULD HAVE HEARD 
THE POLICE WERE ON THE WAY AND I WOULD HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO ESCAPE THE PREMISES. THAT IS THE ONLY REASON TO MONITOR 
IN THE FIRST PLACE. 
DURING THE TRIAL T H E R E W A S CONFLICT AND AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING THERE WAS CONFLICT BY TESTIMONY BY BOTH 
POLICE OFFICERS. ONE OFFICER STATED WHEN HE CAME INTO THL 
ROOM THE SCANNER WAS ON AND YOU COULD HEAR THE DISPATCHER 
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\ j OVEF 11. Hit OTHLF OFFICER ST AT LD THAT HE TRIED II AT THE 
2 j APARTMEN1 , COULD NOT HEAR THEIR FREQUENCY OVER IT. AND THE' 
3 ALSO STATED, BOTH OFFICEF BROWN STATED THEY BOTH FOUND IT Af 
4 THE SAME T IML. 
5 Q OKAY. YOU'VE ALSO INDICATED IN YOUR PLEADINGS THAI 
6 SOMETHING ELSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE AS FAR AS THE COAT WAS 
7 j CONCERNED. CAN YOU BRIEFLY EXPLAIN TO THE COURT ABOUT THAT: 
8 A WELL, THE COAT WAS WAY TOO LARGE FOR ME. I GRABBEC 
9 IT BY MISTAKE. IT CONTAINED BASICALLY, A VAST MAJORITY OF ThE 
10 J EVIDENCE THAI WAS USED AGAINST ME. HAD A VERY SMALL .22 SHORT 
n J SEMI-AUTOMATIC IN II, 1r: HAD THE CHANGE THAT WAS SUPPOSEDLY 
TAKEN FPCM A LAUNDRY BURGLARY. IT WAS VERY LARGE FOR ME. I 
PUT IT ON FOR THE JURY. 
14 I ONE OF THE THINGS I WANTED TO POINT OUT, MY LAWYER 
15 I TO POINT OUT, CHRIS LYBBERT'S TESTIMONY STATED I HAD BEEN 
16 j WEARING THE COAT. FOR ABOUT FOUP MONTHS SHE SAID SHE SEEN 
17 ME IN DECEMBER WITH IT AND TIED ME TO THE COAT WHERE I DENY 
18 THAT AND I HAD NOTHING T 0 DO WITH IT. AND THE COAT EXTENDED 
19 WELL PAST MY FINGERS. AND 1 WANTED TO POINT OUT TO THE JURY 
20 THERE WERE NO WEAR MARKS TO THE COAT INDICATING THAT A PERSON1 
21 j TOO SMALL FOR THE COAT HAD BEEN WEARING IT. PARTICULARLY, 
ON THE SLEEVES BECAUSE THE SLEEVIS WOULD BE SHOWING ACCELERATED 
WEAR AS YOU RUB IT AND AS YOU REACH FOR STUFF. 
0 ALL RIGHT, ThANh YOU. NOW, YOU'VE ALSO INDICATED 
A FAILURE TO PFOPERLY ARGUE REGARDING THE CHANGE THAT WAS 
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1 FOUND. DO YOU WAN'l 10 INDICATE 10 THL COURT WHY THAT IS THL 
2 CASE? 
3 A THERE WAS QUITE A FEW REASONS ON THAT* I GAVE YOl 
4 A PAGE OF QUOTES ON THAT. 
5 MR. JONES: MOST OF THOSE, FOR THE RECORD, ARE IN THE 
6 MEMORANDUM WHICH IS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT. 
7 JUDGE BILLINGS: YES. AND I'VE REVIEWED THAI. THANK YOU. 
8 MR. JONES: THANK YOU. 
9 I Q BY MR. JONES: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU FEE! 
10 THE COURT SHOULD BE MADE AWAF E OF IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE FAILURE 
n I OF YOUR ATTORNEY TO OBJECT, EVIDENCE OR ARGUE FACTS? 
1 2 A WELL— 
1 3 Q FOR EXAMPLE, THE LOCK-PICKING TOOLS THAT WERE FOUND 
14 ON YOU. 
15 A THE MANAGER WAS DESCRIBING, HE GAVE TWO DIFFERENT 
15 STATEMENTS ABOUT THE USE OF THL L0CKF1CKS. DURING THE PRELIM 
17 HE STATED HE WATCHED FOR FIVE OR SIX SECONDS THEN HE WENT IN 
18 AND CALLED THE POLICE; DURING THE TRIAL HE STATED HE WATCHED 
19 FOR A LONGER PERIOD, THEN I SWITCHED PICKS, I REACHED INTO A 
20 POCKET AND GOT OUT OTHER PICKS. BUT BECAUSE OF THE—IT'S HARD 
21 TO—JUST THE BURGLARY TO DESCRIBE. THE MANAGER WAS LOOKING 
22 DIRECTLY BEHIND ML. 
23 MY FIRST LAWYER HAD CHECKED THL DEVICE, FELLING THL 
24 DEVICE ON THE DOOR. IN THL DOOR IS A VERY SMALL OPTICAL TYPE 
25 THAT DISTORTS 1 HE VISION. AND IN ORDER TO PICK THE LOCK 1 
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WOULD HAVE TO bl VIM CT LY IN FRONT 01 THE LOCK. IT TAKES 
TWO IMPLEMENIS TO UCt THE LOCK AND IT TAKES A CERTAIN AMOUNT 
Of, 1 DON'T KNOW, CERTAIN AMOUNT OF POSITIONING. THE PICK 
HAS TO BE LEVEL, THE TENSION IS, YOU KNOW, KIND OF INVOLVED, 
EUT YOU HAVE TO BL DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE LOCK. AND HE 
WAS DIRECTLY BEHIND ME VIEWING THROUGH THE DOOR. AND THERF 
IS NO WAY HE COULD HAVE OBSERVED. MY BODY WOULD HAVE BEEN 
BLOCKING THE ACTUAL PICKING OF THE LOCK ON THE DOOR. THERE 
IS NO WAY HE COULD HAVE SEEN IT. 
Q THANK You VERY MUCH. NOW, MOVING ON TO THE SECOND 
MAJOR CONTENTION THAT THE PROSECUTOP FAILED TO PROVIDE YOU 
WITH LXCULEATCFY EVIDENCE. WOULD YCU PLEASE INDICATE TO THE 
COURT WHY YOU FEEL 1 HAT WAS THE CASE? 
A WELL, THERE WAS A NUMBER OF REASONS ON THAI. FIRST 
OF ALL, 1 WAS AFFESTLD AT FIRST, THAT NIGHT, FOR BEING IN THE 
APARTMENT. I DON'T REMLMbLh--THE FIRST NIGHT IT WAS FOR THE 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY HAPPENING OR THAT CAME ALONG THE NEXT 
MORNING. THE NEXT MORNING, APPARENTLY THE MANAGER HAD CALLED 
THE POLICE AND SAID THERE HAD BEEN A BREAK-IN IN THE LAUNDRY 
ROOM AND I WAS--THE WAY I FELT IT HAPPENED THEY DECIDED RIGHT 
OFF 1 WAS GOING TO BE THE SUSPECT IN THAT BECAUSE I WAS 
ARRESTED THE NIGHT BEFORE IN THE APARTMENT. THEY MADE NO 
EFFORT. THI RE WERE I h\ MAI-KS ON THE DOOR. THERE WAS NO 
MENTION OF THAT DURING THE TRIAL THAT THE WOOD AROUND THE 
LOCK BOLT WAS REMOVIV ENOUGH TO EXPOSE THE LOCK BOLT. 
14 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q DID iol' 'ililM lii/.'l LV1DLNCL WOULD HAVE BEEN 
IMPORT AN! 10 YOUR DEFENSE? 
A WELL, THLRL'S NOTHING FOUND ON ME THAT COULD BE 
USED TO PRY WITH, PKY WOOD OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT WITH. IN 
FAC1, I HAD LOCKPICKS ON--THL MANAGER CLAIMED I WAS USING 
IT TO OPEN THE DOOR Willi. SHC.sLD I COULD HAVE ENTERED THE 
ROOM WITHOUT USING THE KIEL CF IORCE. THERE WAS APPARENTLY 
NO EFFORT MADE TO TAKE FINGERPRINTS OR PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE 
PRY MARKS ON THE DOOR OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. 
I ALSO FELL THAI 1 HEY FOUND OUT LATER ON ON THAI, 
THAT THE GUN WAS SLi.: IN, THE GUN 1 HAT WAS FOUND IN THE COP. 
WAS SENT IN FOR PRINTS, BUT YET NO PRINT REPORT WAS PRODUCE 
AT THE TRIAL. I BELIEVL 11-.AT SHOV.'S MY PRINTS ARE NOT FOUt* 
ON THE GUN. THAT WAS NI YEP F'r^UGHT UP. 
Q YOU'VE ALSO I:.LLC.".ID IN YOUR PLEADINGS THAT YCl 
FEEL THAT THE PROSECfT 01 i:~:.L, IMPROPER TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE 
WhY DO YOU FEEL THAI IS ThL CASE: | 
A WELL, IN GOING OYER THE CASE I'M SURE HE MUST HA\ 
COME UP AGAINST A DISCREPANCY, PAP.TICULARY WITH THE SCANNEF 
THAT REALLY IRKED ML. HE MUST HAVE INTERVIEWED THE OFFICI 
OR AT LEAST READ THEIR FRLLiM HEARING TESTIMONY AND SEEN THE] 
TESTIMONY WAS C0NTRAD1 C'J 0- J . 
1 ASSUME 11IA'; ! : : -
THE EVIDENCE HIMSELF AND LJ>/„' 
HAVE TURNED ON THE SCANNER At 
:. 'IHt TRIAL STARTED HE WENT OVI 
I NED THE EVIDENCE. AND HE MUS 
'j FOUND OUT THE SCANNER II SELI 
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DID NOT HAVi POLICE fKEQUENCIES ON IT. HE MADE NO EFFORT 
DURING THE TRIAL TO SHOW THAT THE SCANNER HAD NO POLICE 
FREQUENCIES ON IT. AND 1 HAD EEEN STATING ALL ALONG MY LAWYE 
INFORMED THEM THERE WAS ONLY WEATHER FREQUENCIES ON THE RADIO 
SO HE KNEW I WAS GOING TO DENY THERE WERE ANY POLICE FREQUENCIE, 
ON IT. 
Q THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOU'VE ALSO ALLEGED IN YOU) 
PETITION THAT YOU WERE DENIED COMPULSORY PROCESS. CAN YOU 
BRIEFLY EXPLAIN TO THE COURT WHY OR HOW THAT OCCURRED? 
A FOR WITNESSES? 
Q YES. 
A THERE JS ALWAYS—I *'AS TOLD SHORTLY BEFORE THE TRIAI 
STARTED, I THINK IT WAS THE LAY BEFORE WHEN MR. VALDE2 CAM! 
DOWN AND TALKED TO ME, WHICH HE WAS SUPPOSED TO COME BACK THAT 
EVENING AND HI KEVEL SHOWED UP, THOUGH HE TOLD ME HE WOULD, 
HE TOLD ME THERE WAS A WOMAN1 WHO SHE TOLD THE POLICE SHE WOKE 
UP AT NIGHT, HEARD A PRYING NOISE-
MS. HORNAK: OBJECTION; HEARSAY. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: SUSTAINED. 
Q BY MR. JONES: DC YOU THINK THE OBTAINING OF A 
WITNESS WHO IS A RESIDENT 'i THE APARTMENT COMPLEX MAY HAVE 
HELPED YOUR CASE? 
A YES, 1 DELI EVE IT WOULD HAVE. 
Q YOU'VE ALSO INDICATED THAT YOU FELT THE TRIAL COVP.l 
ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING YOU TO INTRODUCE MORE SCANNER EVIDENCE. 
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* COULD YOU INDICATE WHAT THAT IVIDENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN THAI 
2 J YOU WANTED TO PRESENT? 
3
 I A WELL, DURING THL TRIAL, JUST BEFORE 1 WAS TO TAKE 
4 THE STAND, THERE WAS A SHORT RECESS AND WE TURNED THE RADIC 
5 ON IN THE PROSECUTOR'S PRESENCE AND RECEIVED THE WEATHER 
6 FREQUENCY. DURING THE TRIAL, DURING MY TESTIMONY, I TURNED 
7 THE RADIO ON SO THE JURY ITSELF COULD SEE THAT IT DID NOT HAVE 
8 j ANY POLICE FREQUENCIES ON IT. IT DIDN'T RECEIVE ANYTHING AT 
9 J FIRST. IN ABOUT A SHORT EEMOD, I'D SAY ABOUT FIVE SECONDS, 
!0 J THE JUDGE ORDERED ML 10 'i NI N THE SCANNER OFF. I WAS WILLING 
11 J TO LEAVE THE THING ON, ALL.v; THE THING TO SCAN THROUGH. BUT 
12 THERE ARE NO POLICE FREQUENCIES ON II. HE ORDERED SOME ONE 
13 TO TURN IT OFF. HE SAID IT MIGHT) SCARE SOME ONE. 
14 | Q YOU'VE ALSO ALLEGED YOU WERE DENIED AN EFFECTIVE : 
15 APPEAL. CAN YOU TELL THE CCLT.T ERILFLY WHY YOU FEEL THAT WAY? 
'6 | A I WAS VERY UPCL'i THE WAY MY ATTORNEY HAD HANDLED 
17 THE TRIAL. I HAD WRITTEN NIN LOSS ABOUT IT AND FINALLY I GOT 
18 J AN APPEAL ATTORNEY OUTSIDE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION. 
'9 HE REFUSED—FIRST OF ALL, HE WOULDN'T COME DOWN 
20 AND TALK TO ME. HE REFUSED MY REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE TRIAL 
21 TRANSCRIPT. THE ONLY CONTACT 1 HAD WITH HIM WAS OVER THE PHONE 
22 I AND SOME LETTERS THAT 1 HA;; WRITTEN HIM. HE KEPT TELLING ME 
23 HE COULD FIND NO EVIDENCE CI ATTORNEY NEGLIGENCE. I MADE 
24 POINTS, ISSUES OF CERTAIN THINGS, AND HE WOULD NOT RESPOND 
25 TO THEM. AT ONE TIME I ar.'- ; •; JKV WITH HIM AND HE SAID I WAS, 
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HE WOULD WRITE ME A LETTER EXPLAINING WHAT WAS WRONG. AN 
HE NEVER SENT THE LETTER. 
1 BROUGHT UP I FELT THE JUDGE WAS IK 1HE WRONG 
AND 1 THOUGHT IT WAS A SPECIFIC POINT SHE BROUGHT UP, BUT BY 
NO*! PEKMITING ML 70 DEMONSTRATE THE SCANNER BEFORE THE JUR 
AND ABOUT THE MANAGER'S WIFE TESTIFYING AT TRIAL. IT WAS A 
CLEAR UNDERSTANDING SHE WOULD NOT TESTIFY AT TRIAL. 
Q DID YOU, IN FACT, ASK HIM TO APPEAL THESE ISSUES 
YOU'VE JUST TALKED ABOUT? 
A YES, I DID. IN AN APPELLATE BRIEF HE FILED HE 
MENTIONED IN PASSING, BUI DIDN'T MAKE AN ISSUE OF IT, THE FAC 
THAT 1HE JUDGE DID NOT ALLOW ML TO PLAY THE SCANNER, BUI H 
D1DV'MAKE AN ISSUE OUT OF IT. 
0 NOW, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU FEEL THIS COUR 
SHOULD BE AWARE OF BEFORE IT DECIDES YOUR CASE? 
A WELL, NEARLY EVERYTHING THE MANAGER SAID AT THE 
TIME OF THE TRIAL WAS CONTRADICTORY. 
IN PREPARATION FOR THE TRIAL I WAS IN THE JAIL 
I HAD TAKEN MY COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT , 
I NUMBERED THE LINES BY THE QUESTIONS, I SET UP SHEETS LIKE 
I GAVE YOU WHERE SUBJECTS WERE LIKE THE SCANNER AND WHERE 
THE LIES ARE TO BE FOUND ON THE SHEETS, FOR SPECIFIC 
TESTIMONY. AND EVERY TIME THE MANAGER SAID SOMETHING THAT 
HE CONTRADICTED HIMSELF AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. I POIN' 
THIS OUT' TO MR. VALDEZ , I SHOW HIM MY COPY OF THE PRELIM AN! 
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1 SHOW HIM ON HIS COPY. AND MANY A TIMES HE IGNORED ME. 
WHEN THEY PRESENTED THE EVIDENCE ON THE HALLWAY 
WHERE IT SHOWS THE DOORS ARE FLUSH WITH THE HALLWAY HE IGNOREI 
THAT. HE WAS VERY DIFFICULT. I'D SAY SOMETHING TO HIM; HI 
HAD A HARD TIME. HE SEEMED LIKE HE COULDN'T HANDLE DETAIL, 
HE KEPT TELLING ME TO WRITE IT DOWN. I'D WRITE IT DOWN ANI 
ONE TIME HE GLANCED AT IT IT DIDN'T LOOK LIKE HE FOCUSED Hit 
EYES ON IT. HE WAS VERY UNCOOPERATIVE WITH ME. I GOT VER1 
ANYGRY WITH HIM. 
THE FIRST DAY I LEAVE IN THE MORNING OF THE TRIA1 
BECAUSE OF ALL OF THE EVIDENCE HE WAS LEAVING OUT. WE HAD 1 
LITTLE CONSULTATION. HE TOLD ME IT WAS GOING TO BE A TWO-DA1 
TRIAL, ALL THE WITNESSES WOULD BE RECALLED, HE WOULD BE B: 
THAT NIGHT TO GO OVER THE TESTIMONY WITH ME AND WE COULD CLEAl 
IT UP THE NEXT DAY. HE DIDN'T SHOW UP THAT NIGHT. I MADE 
AN EFFOP1 TO TRY AND MAKE SOME QUESTIONS FOR ME ON CROSS-
EXAMINATION. I DIDN'T WANT TO DO THIS BECAUSE I DIDN'T FEEL 
I WAS DESPERATE TO GET CERTAIN FACTS. 
MS. HORNAK: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. I THINK MR. PORTER'S 
JUST RAMBLING AND MOST OF THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTIFIED TO.: 
JUDGE BILLINGS: OVERRULED. HE MAY TELL HIS STORY. 
MR. JONES: GO AHEAD. 
A BY THE WITNESS: I MADE CERTAIN EFFORTS TO TRY AND 
BRING OUT ON MY OWN SELF CERTAIN EVIDENCE 1 THOUGHT WOULD BE 
IN MY FAVOR DEALING WITH THE SCANNER AND THE FACT THAT I HAD 
19 
LOCKED--TKL MANAGER HAD TESTIFIED THAT THERE ARE PADLOCKS 0 
IHE WASHING MACHINES AND WASHING MACHINES CONTAINED QUARTER 
AND A LOT MORE MONEY THAN WHAT WAS TAKEN FROM THE DRYERS 
AND I TRIED TO GET IT POINTED OUT THE TOOLS I HAD ON ME, 
HAD, COULD HAVE OPENED THE WASHING MACHINES AND WITHOUT THE 
NEED OF GETTING FORCE. 
I HAD A NOTEBOOK THAT HAD ALL KINDS OF FREQUENCIES 
I TRIED TO. GET HIM T G POINT OUT THAT THEY ARE 1YRIN3 TO MAK 
A BIG DEAL. 11 LISTS FREQUENCIES. YOU NEED MORE THAN THE 
POLICE FREQUENCIES IN ORDER TO USE THE THING IN A CRIMINAL 
WAY. AND HE SENT A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT FREQUENCY IS FOR WHA' 
AND WHAT FREQUENCY THAT IT OPERATES UNDER. 
Q MR. JONES: LET ME GO EACK AND ASK YOU A BRIEF 
QUESTION ABOUT YOU. 
NOW, YOU INDICATED THAT YOU ASKED YOUR ATTORNL' 
TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT CERTAIN THINGS; li 
THAT CORRECT ": 
A RIGHT. 
Q DID HE? 
A HE ATTEMPTED TO. HE DIDNfT DO EVERYTHING THAT 
HAD ASKED HIM TO. 
Q WHY DID YOU ATTEMPT TO CROSS-EXAMINE YOURSELF? 
A BECAUSE SO MUCH INFORMATION WAS BEING LEFT OUT. 
1 K LPT T E L L ] NG H IM rI H E K L I S A LOT MO R E T E CH I." I C A L D L1 A I L £ 
INVOLVED IN fiHiS THAN YOU REALIZE. I BEEN TELLING HIM THIS 
20 
I Oh M0N1US. 
0 BASICALLY, YOU WANTED TO HELP YOUR ATTORNEY OUT? 
A YES. 
0 IS THERE ANY!HI KG ELSE^ VERY BRIEF NOW. 
A I DON'T KNOW. JUST — 
MR. JCNLS: THAN! YOU VERY MUCH. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR MR. PORTER? 
MS. HORNAK: YES. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION, 
EY MS. HORNAK: 
Q MR. PORTER, YOU ALLEGE THAT MR. VALDEZ FAILED TO 
MEET WITH YOU AND FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE. CAN YOU 
RECALL APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY TIMES HE FAILED TO MEET WITH YOU? 
A NO! AN EXACT NUMBER. 
Q ONE OR TWO MAYBE? 
A WELL, IT WASN'T ALWAY$ JUST FAILING TO MEET WITH 
ME. HE'D SHOW UP FOR A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AND PROMISE 
TO COME BACK AND PROMISE 10 SPEND MORE TIME. HE SHOWED UP A 
I 
NUMBER OF TIMES BUT 1 HAD TO REPpAT MYSELF. HE DIDN'l SLt.-> 
TO GRASP WHAT I WAS TRYING TO TELL HIM. AND HE WAS ALWAYS 
PROMISING HE'D COML B/ CK WHEN HE COULD SPEND MORE TIME. 
USUALLY HE'S SEEING O'l HER CLIENT^. 
Q HOW MANY WITNESSES DID YOU TELL HIM YOU WANTED TC 
HAVE HIM 'ILSllFY ON YOUF BEHALF? 
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1 A T R I E D 1 0 GET THE S T A T F ' S LOCKSMITH EXPERT TO DO 
2 "HAT . 
3 i 0 'I tiAi V\AF A'i U 1 A L , R I G H T ? 
4 i A THAT WAS Al T k l A L 1 TOLD HIM I WANTED HIM TO CHEC 
5 THE R E S I D E N T S OF THE B U I L D I N G ON THE S I D E WHERE WE HAD BEE 
6 PARKED. 
7 Q FOR POTENTIAL P E O P L E — 
8 A WHO HAD SEEN HIM. 
9 j Q DID YOU EVER GIVE HIM AN ADEQUATE DESCRIPTION 0 
j 0 j THOSE FEOPLL OR ANY NAMES? 
H j A I GIVE HIM THE DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUCK AND THE 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
F I R S T — 
Q DID YOU HAVE A LICENSE PLATE OR A MAKE OR ANYTHING 
A NO, IT WAS DARK. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT IT WAS 
FORD, I THINK. 
Q DID YOU EVER GIVE HIM A DESCRIPTION OF THE PEOPLE-
MALE, FEMALE? 
A YLS, BOTH MALES, ROUGH DESCRIPTION. 
Q ENOUGH FOR HIM TO FIND THEM? 
A NO, NOT ENOUGH FOR HIM TO FIND THEM. I COULDN'T 
FIND THEM MYSELF IF I WANTED. 
Q SO THERE WAS A LOCKSMITH YOU TRIED TO SUBPOENA TC 
TRIAL AND THEPE WERL A COUPLE OF PEOPLE THERE THE NIGHT OE 
THE BURGLARY? 
A YfS. WLLL, YES, PEOPLE I WAS WITH THE NIGHT OF THE 
Lilt en M. An.br ot.c, C.S.K. 22 
ALLEGED BURGLARY. AND TO CLARIFY, THE LOCKSMITH, IT WAS THE 
STATE'S WITNESS. WE LATER FOUND OUT THE JUDGE WAS PERMITTING 
US — V\E TRIED 10 GET IN TOUCH WITH 1 HE STATE'S WITNESS. THE^ r 
OBJECTED, BECAUSE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES I DON'T UNDERSTAND, 
WE COULD HAVE FOUND HIM AS DEFENDANT'S WITNESS. ACCORDING 
TO THE SI ATE'S APPEAL TRANSCRIPT, 1 HAT WL COULD HAVE CALLEL 
HIM LATER ON AS A DEFENDANT'S WITNESS. AND HE FAILED TO DG 
THAT. AND HE KNEW I WANTED THAT DONE. I MADE THE MOTION 
MYSELF THIS MAN, YOU KNOW — 
Q OKAY. 
A —TO BE QUESTIONED. 
0 NOW, YOU SAID THAT MR. VALDEZ DID NOT POINT OUT 
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE MANAGER'S TESTIMONY. ISN'T IT TRUE--
HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO READ THE TRANSCRIPT? 
A YES, 1 HAVE. 
0 AND I S N ' T IT TRUE AT PAGES 1 4 3 AND 1 4 4 HE DID POINT 
OUT SOME I N C O N S I S T E N C I E S ? 
A VERY FEW, VERY FEW. THERE I S A LOT MORE S E R I O U S 
ONES HE LEFT OUT. 
Q THE TESTIMONY OF C H R l £ LYBBERT, THE APARTMENT 
MANAGER'S W I F E , WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO BE EXCLUDED AND NOT T E S T I F Y , 
I S N ' T IT TRUE MR. VALDEZ DID OBJECT TO THAT AND THE JUDGE WAS 
THE ONE WHO PERMITTED HER TO T E S T I F Y ? 
A Y1AH, AFTER 1 POINTED OUT TO MP. VALDEZ. THEY HAF 
A PR1VATL MILTING lrl TH1 BENCH AND THE PROSECUTOR SAID HE WAS 
1 UNAWARE THAI THL CONDITION WAS LAID AT THE PRELIM AND IT WA 
2 THE JUDGL THAT ORDERED SHE BE ALLOWED TO TESTIFY. 
3 I Q OKAY. IN TERMS OF THE CAMPING EQUIPMENT IT'S TRUJ 
4 MR. VALDLZ BROUGHT THAT OUT IN THE TRANSCRIPT AT PAGE 214 
5 I ISN'T l'i : 
6 J A II WAS CAM! iNG EQUIPMENT BUI I'M NvjT SLFE OF THE 
7 I PAGE NUMBER. I FEEL IT WAS INADEQUATELY BROUGHT OUT. 
8 Q BUT IT WAS ADDRESSED. 
9 A I BELIEVE IT WAS. I BELIEVE IT WAS. 
10 J 0 AND AS TO THE SCANNER, YOU TESTIFIED AS TO THAT 
11 IN DETAIL IN YOUR TESTIMONY, DIDN'T YOU? 
12 I A YES, BUT 1 WAS THE DEFENDANT. 
13 I Q BUT THAT WAS ALSO BROUGHT OUT IN CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
14 J A THE DETAIL OF THE SCANNER ITSELF—DETAIL IN THE 
15 | SCANNER WAS NEVER BROUGHT OUT, NOT EVEN IN MY TESTIMONY. 
16 I THERE WAS SOME DETAIL BUT THE ACTUAL DETAIL NEEDED TO SHOW 
17 J IT WAS NOT BEING USED AS A BURGLARY TOOL AND IN REFEFENCE 
18 TO FREQUENCIES. AND THE OTHER THINGS WAS THIS WAS—PART OF 
19 MY COMPLAINT IS I KEPT TRYING TO TELL HIM THERE WAS A LOT 
20 MORE DETAIL INVOLVED IN THIS THAN HE REALIZED, A LOT MCFE 
21 TECHNICALS THAN YOU REALIZED. YOU'VE GOT TO SIT WITH ME 
22 J WHEU YOU GOT SOME TIME SO WL CAN GO OVER THIS SO YOU KNOW 
23 j WHAT QUESTIONS TO ASK. THAT'S WHY I TRIED TO QUESTION THE 
24 SECOND LL\ OF TRIAL, ATTEMFTED TO, WHERE I COULD CROSS-
25 EXAMINE MYSLL1 . 
Q YOU CLAIMED YOU WERE DENIED COMPULSORY PROCESS TC 
OBTAIN WITNESSES BLCAUSL YOU COULDN'T OBTAIN A WOMAN TO 
1 EST I FY WHOSE APARTMENT HAD ALLEGEDLY BEEN BROKEN INTO. 
A NO, SOMEONE—SHE CLAIMS SOMEONE HAD ATTEMPTED 
TO PRY THE DOOR OPEN. 1 WAS TOLD BY MR. VALDEZ THAT THE 
PROSECUTOR HAD SUBPOENAED HER AND SHE WAS GOING TO EL THERE 
AT THE TRIAL. AND AT THE TRIAL THERE WAS NO — SHE WAS NEVER 
BROUGHT ON THE STAND. 
Q ARE YOU SPECULATING THEN THAT IF SHE HAD BEEN 
THERE TC TESTIFY THAT YOU WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONVICTED? 
A I THINK IT SHOWS SOMEBODY ELSE WAS IN THE BUILDINC 
USING FORCE TO ENTRY. I DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO PRY WITH. 
THERE WAS NOTHING FOUND ON ME. I THINK IT INDICATES SOMEON3 
IS IN THE BUILDING USING FORCE ENTRY TECHNIQUES TO COMMIT 
CRIMES. 
Q NOW, MR. PORTER, THESE! ARE ALL THE ISSUES THAT 
YOU HAVE CONCERNING THIS CASE; IS THAT RIGHT? YOU'VE 
RAISED ALL THE ISSUES YOU THINK TO BE IN ERROR? 
A WELL, THERE IS A LITTLjE BIT MORE DETAIL I'D LIKE 
TO ADD TO IT BECAUSE THE BASIC—OKAY, I'M NOT A LEGAL EXPERT 
SO I REALLY CAN'T ANSWER THAT, BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE THING: 
HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED. 
Q I WANT TO MAKE SURE YdU ARE NOT GOING TO FILE 
ANOTHER PETITION A MONTH FROM NOWi DEALING WITH THE SAME CASE. 
A I'M NOT SAYING 1 WON'T DO THAT. I DON'T KNOW 
WHAT •S — WHY 1 WOULPN"! OK WHY 1 WOULD. 
0 NOW, ON YOUR APFLAL MR. GAITHER REPRESENTED YO 
ON APFEAL; IS 1HAT RIGHT? 
A RIGHT. 
Q AND ISN'T IT TRUE THAT HE SENT YOU A COPY OF THE 
BRIEF HE WAS FILING AND ASKED YOU IF THOSE WERE ALL THE ISSUE, 
THAT YOU WISHED TO ADDRESS? 
A HL ASKED ME--HE SENT ML A COPY OF HIS DRAFT AND HI 
DIDN'T ASK ME IF THOSE WERE ALL THE ISSUES I ADDRESSED. HI 
KNEW. I SENT LETTERS. I PHONED HIM. THE ONLY THING I HAI 
TO DO WAS TO COMMENT ON t'HAT HE WAS GOING TO FILE. 
0 BUT HE DID MEET WITH YOU AND DISCUSS THOSE ISSUES 
WITH YOU. 
A NEVER IN PERSON. HE REFUSED TO SEE ME. 
Q NOW, IN TERMS OF THE QUARTERS AND DIMES THAT WERE 
FOUND YOU ARE BASICALLY ALLEGING THERE'S INCONSISTENCIES 11 
THE TESIlMONi BECAUSE OF THE TESTIMONY AT THE PRELIM TRIAL 
THERE WAS $200.00 FOUND AND AT THE TRIAL THERE WAS $20.00 
FOUND. 
A NO, THERE'S SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY, I 
THINK NEEDS SOME LOOKING INTO. THE MANAGER HAD TESTIFIED AT 
THE PRELIMINARY THAT CHANGE WAS MISSING FROM BOTH DRAWERS OI, 
BOTH DPYLRS, BOTH DPAWELS APE EMrTY; PRELIMINARY, ONE DRAWEP 
WAS MISSING. A'i 1 h i VMLIMINAFY HEARING HL SAID HE HAD NO 
KNOWLEDGE WHAT WAS IN 1 ItL INDIVIDUAL MACHINES BECAUSE HE AND 
THI W1FL DIDN'T COUNT T HI MONE\. HI—THEY JUST TUFNED 11 
OVER TO THE MANAGER. 
AT THF TRIAL HE SAID THE DRAWER WAS JUST STICKING 
GUI CF THE DRYER, THAI IT WAS THE ONLY ONI WITH THE CHANGE 
MISSING, HE KNEW THERE WAS TWENTY OR THIRTY COLLARS, AFPRCX-
IMATE AMOUNT FOUND ON ML,, IN THE DRAWER, BECAUSE HE AND HIS 
WIFE COUNTED ON THE KITCHEN TABLE WITH THE MANAGER. 
IN ADDITION, HE ALSO TESTIFIED THE DRAWEFS ARE 
USUALLY AN INCH TO AN INCH FULL HIGH ON A FOUR EY SEVEN INCH 
DRAWER, AN INCH TO AN INCH HIGH WITH DIMES. HE REPEATEDLY 
SAID THAT. ANT HE SAID HE CHECKED THE DRAWERS EVERY TWO 
WEEKS FOR THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND THERE WERE ALWAYS AN 
INCH TO AN INCH AND-A-HALF, CONSIDERABLY MORE TIMES THAN THE 
AMOUNT FOUND ON1 THE WASHER—I MEAN, THE DRYER ONLY TAPES 
DIMES, YET FOUND ON ME WAS NICKLES, DIMES AND PENNIES. 
FOUND IN A COAT WAS NICKLES, DIMES AND PENNIES, AND I BELIEVE 
THAT FIRST OF ALL HE STATED THAT BOTH DRYERS WERE EMPTY AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. SO IF THERE IS TWENTY TO THIRTY DOLLAPS 
IN THE ONE DRYER, APPROXIMATELY DOUBLE THAT FOUND ON ME IF 
I HAD STOLEN THE MONEY. 
Q SO THERE WFRE INCONSISTENCIES IN HIS TESTIMONY--
A ALL OVER 7 HI I LACE . 
0 --THAT l\t . VALDEZ POINTED OUT AT TFIAL? 
A NO, HE DIDN'T POINT THOSE OUT. AND THOSE AF E VLH 
SERIOUS ERRORS. 
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